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Abstract—Exploring the interference-emitting friendly jam-
mers to protect the sensitive communications in the presence of
eavesdroppers has increasingly being investigated in literature.
In parallel, scavenging energy from abient radio signals for
energy-constrained devices, namely wireless energy harvesting
(WEH), has also drawn significant attention. Without relying on
external energy supply, the wireless-powered friendly jammer by
WEH from legitimate wireless devices is an effective approach
to prolong their lifetime and gain the flexibility in deployments.
This paper studies the online optimization of the placement and
WEH of a set of friendly jammers in a geographic location
with the energy-efficiency (EE) consideration. We adopt a simple
“time switching” protocol where power transfer and jammer-
assisted secure communications occur in different time blocks
when WEH requests are launched. Our scheme has the following
important advantages: 1) The proposed online jammers place-
ment and interfering power allocation to attack eavesdroppers is
the first distributed and scalable solutions within any specified
geographic region; 2) We model the WEH for jammers as a
JAM-NET lifetime maximization problem, where online scheduling
algorithms with heterogeneous energy demands of each jammer
(from energy sources) are designed; 3) Under our model, the
problem of placing a minimum number of jammers with distance-
based power assignments is NP-hard, and near optimal PTAS
approximation algorithms are provided; 4) When durations of
the eavesdropping and legitimate communicating are available
and the scenario is extended to the multi-channels setting, our
results are strengthened to see further improved EE and reduced
number of jammers. Simulations back up our theory.
Index Terms—Wireless power transfer, energy harvesting,
friendly jamming, security, energy efficiency, online learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Due to the inapplicability and high computational complex-
ity of cryptography in many dynamic wireless environments,
physical layer security techniques [1], [2] for securing the
transfer of highly sensitive information in wireless com-
munications have attracted significant attention in the past
decades. Systems such as mobile personal healthcare records
[5], contactless payment cards [6], telemedicine systems using
wireless networks [7] and military sensor networks [8] all
employ wireless technologies to transmit potentially sensitive
information. In particular, placing jammers as cooperative
communication nodes has recently been explored as an ef-
fective means to achieve the secure wireless communications
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from eavesdroppers [3], [4]. By exploiting the shared nature
of wireless channels, the successful deployments of jammers
for security must achieve the twin goals that i) reducing
the Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) of eaves-
droppers to a level that far below a threshold for successful
reception, and ii) maintaining the sufficient channel qualities
such that the SINR at the legitimate receivers are not reduced
too much so as to prevent the reception of wireless information
transfer (WIT). However, this is often realized at the expense
of additional power consumption for friendly jammers.
Conventional energy harvesting methods rely on various
renewable energy sources in the environments, such as solar,
wind, vibration and thermoelectric, that are usually unstable
and uncontrollable. In contrast, the recent advance in radio
frequency (RF) enabled wireless power transfer (WPT) tech-
nology provides an attractive solution by powering wireless
nodes with continuous and stable energy over the air [15].
The key idea of this technology is by leveraging the far-
field radiative properties of electromagnetic wave (EMW), the
wireless nodes could capture EMW remotely from RF signals
and convert it into direct current to charge its battery.
Recently, the WPT has attracted great interests in the
research community on energy constrained wireless networks.
In [16]–[19], the authors studied the sources simultaneously
performing the WPT and WIT to destinations and problem that
how the wireless nodes makes use of the harvested energy
from WPT to enable communications. Motivated by these
works, the process of WET can be fully controlled, hence
it is preferred to be applied in wireless networks with crit-
ical quality-of-service requirements, such as secure wireless
communications. In [20]–[22], the authors considered secure
communications with the existence of a single information
receiver and several wireless energy-harvesting eavesdroppers.
In [23], the authors presented the coexistence of three types
of destination in a simple wireless communication scenario:
an information receiver, an eavesdropper and a harvesting
wireless energy receiver. As noticed, all these works [20]–
[23] on only focus on the process of energy-harvesting, the use
of which at the receivers (e.g., friendly jammers) for secure
communications is not studied. Recently, work [24] used the
harvested power at a friendly jammer as a useful resource to
emit constructive interference to attack the eavesdroppers that
secures the legitimate wireless communication link for the first
time. However, their focus is only on a single communication
link, where the placement of multiple friendly jammers in
a geographical locations and and the energy efficiency (EE)
issue in the power management for general wireless networks
applications are not studied yet.
Similar to [9]–[11], we consider the following typical sce-
nario that the legitimate communication is often conducted in
some restricted geographic locations, where jammers placed in
the vicinity are used to secure the legitimate communication.
Different from offline (centralized) solution [9]–[11] that the
transmission power and number of jammers are required to be
optimized separately over a known geographic region, we do
not restrict the scale and geometry of the geographic locations
and emphasize the potential dynamics of nodes within the
secure communication. Hence, distributed and online jammers
placement protocols are desirable. In this case, the friendly
jammers have the flexibility to be placed randomly at any fea-
sible locations. Therefore, their lifetime is usually constrained
to the energy stored in the battery, and WEH as a promising
approach [12]–[14] is demanding to prolong their lifetime.
Thus, it is highly motivating to study the EE by leveraging
both the WEH and the interfering power allocation processes
in the power management.
B. Our Work and Contribution
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the legitimate communications
within a region, named as storage S, surrounded by a fence
F, and the jammers are placed between the space of S and F
to protect the legitimate communications from eavesdroppers
lying outside the fence. To this end, the friendly jammers act as
passive security assistants of legitimate communication links.
The deployments of this low cost and simple passive jammers
brings both the important advantages and challenges: on the
one hand, the WEH-based scheme without any power line
connection facilitate the flexibly online jammer deployments.
Such placements are inherently local and particularly useful in
distributed deployments, which is highly desirable for complex
geographic areas, e.g., lofty and rugged hills, rough grounds,
pot-holed city streets and architectures, etc. and large-scale
network deployments; on the other hand, jammers should have
low design cost and complexity as well as have high effi-
ciency in energy harvesting method to enable its functionality.
Moreover, the jammers are not capable to communicate with
each other and can only passively report their “remaining
energy status” (as “energy demands” from the perspective of
legitimate networks) periodically to the transmitters. In these
settings, when a request of placing a new jammer targeting on
a passive eavesdropper (or potential eavesdropping position)
arrives, an online algorithm needs to decide whether to accept
the request and assign a transmission power (one out of F
channels in the multi-channel setting) to it. Decisions about
the acceptance as well as the power and channel assignments
cannot be revoked later.
To solve the above secure communications problem, we
propose to use a set of wireless-powered friendly jammers as a
defensive and constructive interference-emitting companions,
where jammers harvest energy via WPT from the legitimate
source nodes. The energy harvesting circuit of the jammers
(e.g., consisting of a passive low-pass filter and diode(s) [26])
is very simple and cost effective, and such a configuration is
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Fig. 1: Friendly jammers-assisted secure communications in
the geographic region against eavesdroppers outside the fence.
Jammers are placed between the fence S and the storage F.
very easy to be controlled by the external energy sources. We
use a simple “time switching” scheme [19], [27] such that
there are two phases within a complete secure communication
circle: namely WPT and WIT for secure communication. In
the first phase, due to locations varies over time and CSI is
not available from the passive jammers to the energy sources
and different energy demand of each jammer, it is challenging
to find the optimal energy scheduling algorithm for WPT.
In the second phase, using competitive analysis, we study
algorithms using distance-based power assignments from each
placed jammer to the eavesdropper location(s). Accepted
placement request must satisfies constraints on the SINR
for both eavesdroppers and legitimate receivers. The aim is
to minimize the number of accepted placement requests of
jammers. We first focus on the case of a single channel for the
request sets with spatial lengths in [1,∆] and average minimal
duration between legitimate WIT and eavesdropping in [1,Λ].
The main contributions of this work are summarized below:
1). The novelty of the work lies in the design of the first
distributed protocol that provides secure communication in
any geographically restricted communication networks using
energy-constrained friendly jammers wirelessly powered by
legitimate transmitters as energy sources.
2). We consider the energy-efficiency (EE) during the whole
design. We adopt a time-division based protocol with during
the WPT phase, where legitimate transmitters only provide
quota total energy E¯ within a total WEH micro-slots of T .
The problem is named as the JAM-NET lifetime maximization.
It is formulated by an adaptive constrained integer linear
program (ILP) to meet the goal of EE with heterogenous
energy demands. We analysis the originally hard problem from
several aspects with practical implementation considerations
by advanced online learning algorithms, which indicates that
the optimal online scheduling algorithms are available. In ad-
dition, for constructive jamming power assignment, we studied
the linear power assignment based on the previous distance-
based power assignment policy, which has the advantage of
being energy-minimal.
3). The friendly jammers only need to know minimal infor-
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mation about the communication taking place. They are proac-
tive rather than reactive, requiring no overhead for the legit-
imate communication nodes and no synchronization amongst
themselves. Our protocol supports dynamic behaviors, e.g.,
mobility, eavesdropping (communicating) completion or addi-
tion/removal of nodes, as along the secure communication are
restricted to the storage. However, our proposed protocol is
adaptive to the situations such information is available, e.g.,
exact positions and frequency of both legitimate communica-
tions and eavesdropping behaviors, and foreseen further EE
improvements and reduced number of jammers.
4). We indicate that it is NP-hard to minimize the number
of placed jammers necessary to protect the geographic domain
of secure communications.
• We derive, for any fixed ε, the upper bound of O((1 +
ε)∆d/2) and O((1 + ε)Λ∆d/2) on the competitive ratio
of any deterministic online algorithm without and with
the knowledge of duration Λ.
• Then, we extend the result to the general polynomial
power assignment with parameter r that cannot yield a
competitive ratio worsen than O((1 + ε)∆min{r,1−r});
for the square root power assignment, it yields an upper
bound of O((1+ε)∆d/2). In fact, we show that this bound
holds for any distance-based power assignment.
• Our upper bounds reveals an exponential gap of the
achievable approximation guarantees between determin-
istic online and offline [9]–[11] algorithms. The main
difficulty of the online scenario turns out to be that the
request cannot be ordered by length due to distributed
deployments. Given r ∈ [0, 1], we showed that the
square root r = 1/2 achieves near optimal competitive
radio among all distance-based power assignments and it
superior to any other polynomial power assignment.
• We extended our analysis to the multi-channel cases. We
generalize the analysis of MULTI-CHAN JAM-Distance
algorithm from 1 to F channels. Using F = F ′ · F ′′
channels is only Ω((1+ε)F ·Λ1/F ′ ·∆1/F ′′)-competitive.
It indicates an exponential reduction in the competitive
ratio, which indicates that the multi-channel diversity
could improve the security of legitimate communications.
C. Related Work
Most related work, e.g. [16]- [23], focused on the wiretap
channel [28] in the field of information theory, in which a
single eavesdropper tries to listen to legitimate communication
between a pair of nodes. It is shown that perfect security
is possible when the eavesdropper’s channel quality is lower
than a threshold. Recent works [29], [30] also focus on
the MIMO wiretap channel where the transmitter, receiver
and eavesdropper may configured with multiple antennas.
In [27], the authors had used a wireless-powered relay to
help the point-to-point communication. In [31], the authors
studied the friendly jamming signal design to help the secure
communication based on the knowledge of the uncontrollable
energy harvesting process. Different from [27] [31], authors
in [24] considered the WEH at a friendly jammer to emitting
constructive jamming power for a secure communication link,
where the jamming power and rate parameters are optimized
for secure communication. However, most of these works
primarily targeted to the theoretical significant due to the
simple scenario under consideration but do not explore the
geometry of the problem sufficiently.
Vilela et al. [32] showed that without any assumptions on
the locations of friendly jammers and eavesdroppers, jammers
could co-transmitting with the legitimate transmitter and in
the vicinity of a common destination. The authors formulated
this setting as a graph and use ILP to find an optimal subset
of jamming nodes. In [33], the authors study the asymptotic
behaviors for jammers and eavesdroppers at the stochastically
distributed locations. In particular, they proposed the concept
of Secure Throughput, which is based on the probability that a
message is successfully received only by legitimate receivers.
To our best knowledge, [9]–[11] are the only works that
adapt friendly jammers into complex geometric positioning
constraints. They provided offline optimal solutions to jammer
placement problem that involves both continuous aspects [10],
[11] (i.e., power allocations) and discrete aspects [9] (i.e.,
jammers placements), but they are necessarily to be solved
separately. Moreover, all the above works do not consider
the issues of WEH and EE for friendly jammers to prolong
their lifetime, which are our main focuses. Another important
line of this work is the study of competitive ratio of the
admitted friendly jammers with instant power allocation in
the distributed setting for secure wireless communications
for the first time. We note that existing related works on
distributed scenarios only studied the competitive ratio for
capacity maximization [35] and online admission control [36]
in classic wireless communications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes our system model. Section III proposes the JAM-
NET lifetime maximization problem, we analyze its learning
performance in several typical and practical implementations.
Section IV focuses on the distributed online jammer placement
and power allocation problem with competitive analysis. We
extend our results to the requests with duration and multi-
channel scenarios in Section V. Simulation results are pre-
sented in Section VI. The paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODELS
A. Environment Model
We consider a Storage/Fence environment model in which
legitimate communication takes place within an enclosure
specified by one or more polygonal regions S ⊂ R3, called the
storage. We do not assume any knowledge of the locations of
communication links in S, but we do assume some properties
of legitimate communication described below. At first, the
legitimate transmitters and receivers can be located at any
point ps ∈ S. Further, there exists a controlled region,
C ⊂ R3, like the band region that contains S in Fig. 1, where
there is no eavesdropper able to be within the interior of C. The
boundary ∂C is referred to as the fence F. Outside of C is the
uncontrolled region U. We assume that there is no hole in C,
which is a union of simply connected regions; otherwise it can
be divided into different regions of storages and fences. We
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Fig. 2: Time frame divided into two phases. The phase one
is for scheduling WPT among multiple energy sources (ESs)
and the phase two is for WIT for secure communications.
are necessary to place the jammers distributively in a region
A called the allowable region. The allowable region permits
us to place the jammers at potential restrictions on locations
that belong to the region of C/S, e.g., the guarded distance
for secure commutations or locations that are easily reached
for maintenance purpose.
B. Wireless Power Transfer and Energy Harvesting Model
We consider the WPT problem with a set of energy sources
(ESs) X = {1, 2, ..., k, ...,K} as legitimate transmitters (Txs)
from the legitimate communication to power a set of friendly
jammers A = {1, 2, ...j, ..., , J} with maximal cardinality J
under all observed time frames. The ESs are assumed to have
no restriction to supply the energy request to each jammer,
but the served energy must be used energy-efficiently. Since
ESs are geographically randomly distributed and the stochastic
placements of jammers, it is desirable to design an online
WPT scheduling algorithm (scheduler) from ESs to jammers
for WEH over time. We employ the time-switching protocol as
illustrated in Fig. 2, where a communication frame is divided
into the two phases. The phase of WPT is divided into three
sub-phases: i) perform a time synchronization among all ESs
to avoid con-channel interference; ii) using the idea of time-
division multiplexing, the time block of second phase is further
divided into micro slots. Online algorithms are necessary,
which schedule the WEH from a single ES k a single jammer j
at each microslot (short as ’slot’) t based on the observed CSI
and energy demands from jammers to ESs (detailed below);
and iii) send an ACK to indicate the completion of the WPT
phase. The jammers can also initiate the next frame for WEH
at the end of last frame when their remaining energy-level
is lower than some threshold. Hence the WIT phase is not
necessarily to be launched at each time frame.
Let the equivalent complex baseband channel from a ES
k to a jammer j is denoted by gtk,j(v), where v denotes the
fading state of the CSI with the instant channel power gain
htk,j(v) = |gtk,j(v)|2 at a micro slot t. For each fading state
v, the portion of signal power split to secure communication
is denoted by α(v) with 0 ≤ α(v) ≤ 1, and that to WEH as
1 − α(v). In general the α(v) can be adjusted over different
fading state over time. For the WPT phase, the scheduling
strategies contains the following two cases, Case I: htk,j(v)
is perfectly known at ESs for each fading state v, referred to
as the known CSI at ESs, which is a simple model but not
realistic; Case II: htk,j(v) is unknown at at the ESs (Txs)
for all the fading state v, referred to as unknown CSI at ESs,
which is practical problem as the passive jammers usually are
not capable to communicate with ESs to estimate the CSI. In
this case, we need to estimate the mean values of htk,j(v) by
online learning algorithms; Given α(v), the harvested energy
(HE) at each slot t (normalized to unitary) at each fading state
v can be expressed as
Qk,j(v) = ξ(1− α(v))htk,j(v)ptk,j(v), (1)
where ξ is a constant coefficient that accounts for the loss
in the energy transducer for converting the HE to electrical
energy to be stored, and ptk,j(v) denotes the scheduled energy
from ES k to j at slot t. Denoted each jammer has an energy
demand cXt,j at slot t, we have the scheduled energy request
from ES Xt at t such that
ptk,j(v) = cXt,j , Xt = k. (2)
Then, the expected HE at each jammer is then given by
µk,j = Ev[Qk,j(v)], ∀k ∈ X , j ∈ J . (3)
Based on the time-division scheme, at each slot t for WEH,
only one ES is activated for WPT according to its distance
to the boundary of storage S, based on which the appearance
of an ES Xt is normalized as an independently with identical
distributed P{Xt = k} = πk, k ∈ X . In this scheme, each
scheduled jammer j ∈ A generates a non-negative HE (as
reward) Yj,t. W.l.o.g., under a given ES Xt = k, the HE
Yj,t’s are independent random variables in [0, 1], where the
better channel gain htk,j(v) (e.g., schedule the nearer jammer)
and the larger energy demand provide better HE at jammer
j. But, the conditional expectation E[Yj,t|Xt = k] = uk,j
is unknown to the scheduler. Moreover, an energy demand is
realized if jammer j is scheduled under ES k. We consider
fixed and known energy demands in this paper, where the
ck,j > 0 when jammer j is served by ES k.
We can formulate the problem as a constrained context-
bandit (CMAB) [34] online learning problem. Similar to tradi-
tional contextual bandits, the ES Xt as a context is observable
at the beginning t, while only the HE of the jammer taken by
the scheduler is revealed at the end of slot t. Specifically, at
the beginning of slot t, the scheduler observes the context Xt
and takes a jammer At from {0}
⋃A, where “0” represents
a dummy jammer that the scheduler skips the current context.
Let Yt and Zt be the HE and energy demand received for
the scheduler in slot t, respectively. If the scheduler takes a
jammer At = j > 0, then the HE is Yt = Yj,t and the energy
demand is Zt = cXt,j . Otherwise, if the scheduler takes the
dummy jammer At = 0, neither HE nor energy demand is
incurred, i.e., Yt = 0 and Zt = 0. We focus on the CMAB
in this work with a known time-horizon T and limited energy
budget E¯ for the goal of EE in WPT, where the process ends
when the scheduler runs out of the energy budget or at the
end of time T .
Formally, an online learning algorithm ̥ is a func-
tion that maps the historical observations Ht−1 =
(X1, A1, Y ;X2, A2, Y2; ...;Xt−1, At−1, Yt−1) and the current
ES Xt to a jammer At ∈ {0}⋃A. The objective of the
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algorithm is to maximize the expected total HEs U̥(T, E¯)
for a given T and an energy budget E¯, i.e.,
maximize U̥(T, E¯) = E̥[
T∑
t=1
Yt]
subject to
T∑
t=1
Zt ≤ E¯,
where the expectation is taken over the distributions of ESs
and energy rewards. Note that we consider a “hard” energy
budget constraint, i.e., the total energy demands should not be
greater than E¯ under any realization.
We measure the performance of the algorithm ̥ by compar-
ing it with the optimal one, which is the optimal algorithm with
known statistics, including the knowledge of πk’s, and uk,j’s
and ck,j’s. Let U∗(T, E¯) be the expected total HE for the
jammers’ networks (JAM-NET) obtained by an offline optimal
algorithm (with hindsight full knowledge). Then, the we define
the term “regret” of the algorithm Γ as
RΓ(T, E¯) = U
∗(T, E¯)− UΓ(T, E¯).
The objective of ̥ is then to minimize the regret. We are inter-
ested in the asymptotic performance, where the time-horizon
T and the energy budget E¯ grow to infinity proportionally,
i.e., with a fixed ratio ρ = E¯/T . The coordination process of
ESs to use up the total budget E¯ is discussed in Section III.
C. Secure Communication Model
The communication model is similar to that of [9]–[11].
W.l.o.g., we assume that the transmission power P˜ is the same
for all legitimate transmitters and the receiving power P¯ is
nearly the same for all receivers within S. On the other hand,
the heard signal at eavesdropper suffers path loss with the
path-loss exponent γ. Formally, for an eavesdropper pe listens
to a transmitter ps ∈ S; the received power is P˜ d−γpspe , where
γ typically in range [2, 6] and dpq = ||p− q|| is the Euclidean
distance between p and q.
We assume that it is co-channel interference free among
legitimate communications and we use the Signal-to-
interference Ratio (SIR) as physical model that only jamming
signals cause interference. Formally, for a legitimate receiver
ps in S, it is the ratio of the transmitted signal power to the
total interference contributed by the jammers,
SIR(J, ps) =
P¯∑
j∈J Pjd
−γ
jps
, (4)
where Pj is the transmission power of jammer j. Similarly, for
an eavesdropper pe, the transmission signal from the storage
suffers path loss. In the case the jammer is passive, we make
an observation point that the maximal signal power received
from a transmitter at the nearest location of pe on S is s(pe),
and we define
SIR(J, pe) =
P˜ d−γs(pe)pe∑
j∈J Pjd
−γ
jpe
. (5)
In [9]–[11], the authors use a simple truth that the total
interference at a location p is usually dominated by the
interference from the nearest jammer to p due to the received
power decreasing exponentially with distance. However, our
model gives religious interference analysis that contributed by
all transmitters.
To facilitate successful receptions of legitimate transmis-
sions, we require that SIR(J, ps) > δs, for all points ps ∈ S
and some specified value of δs. Similarly, to make the eaves-
droppers unable to receive secure messages, we require that
SIR(J, pe) < δe, for points pe ∈ R2/C and some parameter
δe. In summary, the set of friendly jammers need to satisfy
the following constraints:
SIR(J, ps) > δs, ∀ps ∈ S,
SIR(J, pe) < δe, ∀pe ∈ R2/C, (6)
Finally, as indicated in [10], jamming the eavesdroppers at
the fence F is sufficient to ensure that eavesdroppers located
outside the fence are also jammed successfully; ensuring the
legitimate receiver on the boundary of F is not jammed is
sufficient to guarantee that receivers inside F are not jammed.
III. JAM-NET LIFETIME MAXIMIZATION: CONSTRAINED
CONTEXTUAL BANDITS WITH HETEROGENEOUS COSTS
We name the energy harvest problem of JAM-NET as
the JAM-NET lifetime maximization problem. We discuss the
design of algorithms in heterogeneous-energy-demand systems
where energy demand ck,j depends on k and j. We summary
the main results here first and then go into details.
To schedule the WPT from multiple ESs to jammers, we
show that significant complexity incurs when making deci-
sions under those ”medium-quality” ESs other the best and
worst ESs. Because the scheduler needs to balance between
the instantaneous expected harvest energy rewards and the
future rewards, which is very difficult due the coupling ef-
fect introduced by the time and energy budgets constraints.
Thus, we resort to approximations by relaxing the hard time
and energy budget constraints to an average energy budget
constraint. Now, the problem becomes to maximize the ex-
pected rewards (of total harvest energy) with average budget
constraint E¯/T . However, the problem of using the fixed
average budget E¯/T and not taking the remaining time τ and
remaining energy budget bτ into account would not explore
the dynamic structure of the problem, which will lead to
suboptimal solutions. Hence, we propose an Adaptive Integer
Linear Program (AILP) that replaces the fixed average budget
E¯/T by the remaining average budget, i.e., bτ/τ . We indicate
that the performance analysis is non-trivial for the AILP,
although the intuition behind the formulation is quite natural.
Using concentration inequalities, we can show that bτ/τ under
AILP concentrates near the average budget E¯/T with high
probability. This proves that the proposed AILP algorithms
achieves an expected total HE only within a constant to the
optimum expect for certain boundary cases.
Next, gaining the insight from the case of the known
statistics of the expected HE for each jammer, we extend
our analysis to that the expected HE as rewards for jammers
are unknown. During the analysis, we find that the AILP
algorithm only require the ranking of the expected rewards
rather than their actual values. Inspired by this, we combine
the famous upper-confidence-bound (UCB) algorithm [38]
and show that, for the general heterogeneous-energy-demand
systems, our proposed ǫ-ESs-JamNet-UCB-AILP algorithm
achieves O(log(t)) regret that is learning-rate optimal except
for certain boundary case, where it achieves O(
√
t) regret.
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A. Approximation of the Offline Optimal Algorithm: Known
CSI at ESs
In this subsection, we first study the case with known
statistics. We consider the case where the energy demand for
each jammerk under context j is fixed at ck,j , which may be
different for different k and j.
With known statistics, the scheduler knows the context
(ESs) distribution πk’s, the energy demands ck,j ’s, and the
expected rewards of HEs uk,j’s. With heterogeneous energy
demands, the quality of the WEH process a jammer j under
a context k is roughly captured by its normalized expected
HE, defined as ηk,j = uk,j/ck,j . However, the scheduler
cannot only focus on the “best” jammer to serve, i.e., j∗k =
argmaxj∈Aηk,j , for context ES k. This is because there
may exist another jammerj′ such that ηk,j′ < ηk,j∗
k
, but
uk,j′ > uk,j∗
k
(and surely, ck,j′ > ck,j∗
k
). If the energy budget
allocated to each ES k out of the total is sufficient, then
the scheduler may take jammer j′ to maximize the expected
reward of HE. Therefore, the ALP algorithm in this case needs
to decide the probability to take jammer j under ES k, by
solving an ILP problem with an additional constraint that only
on jammer can be taken under each ES. We can show that
ALP achieves O(1) regret in non-boundary cases, and O(
√
T )
regret in boundary cases. We note that the regret analysis of
ALP in this case is much more difficult due to the additional
constraint that couples all jammers under each ES.
In this case, the scheduler needs to consider all jammers
under each ES. Let pk,j be the probability that jammerj is
taken under ES k. We define the following ILP problem:
(LP ′T,E¯) maximize
K∑
k=1
πk
J∑
j=1
pk,juk,j , (7)
subject to: 
K∑
k=1
πk
J∑
j=1
pk,jck,j ≤ E¯/T, (7a)
J∑
j=1
pk,j ≤ 1, ∀k, (7b)
pk,j ∈ [0, 1]. (7c)
The above LP problem LP ′T,E¯ can be solved efficiently by
optimization tools. Let vˆ(p) be the maximum value of LP ′T,E¯ .
Similar to Lemma 1, we can show that T vˆ(p) is an upper
bound of the expected total HE, i.e., T vˆ(p) ≤ U∗(T, E¯).
To obtain insight from the solution of LP ′T,E¯ , we derive
an explicit representation for the solution by analyzing the
structure of LP ′T,E¯ . Note that there are two types of (non-
trivial) constraints in LP ′T,E¯ , one is the “inter-ES” energy
budget constraint (7a), the other is the “intra-ES” constraint
(7b). These constraints can be decoupled by first allocating
energy budget for each context, and then solving a subproblem
with the allocated energy budget constraint for each ES.
Specifically, let ρk be the energy budget allocated to ES k,
then LP ′T,E¯ can be decomposed as follows:
maximize
K∑
k=1
πkvˆk(ρk),
subject to:
K∑
k=1
πkρk ≤ E¯/T
where 
(SPk) vk(ρk) = maximize
J∑
j=1
pk,j , (8a)
subject to
J∑
j=1
pk,jck,j ≤ ρk, (8b)
J∑
j=1
pk,j ≤ 1, pk,j ∈ [0, 1]. (8c)
Next, by analyzing sub-problem SPk, we show that some
jammers can be deleted without affecting the performance, i.e.,
the probability is 0 in the optimal solution.
Lemma 1. For any given ρk ≥ 0, there exists an optimal
solution of SPk, i.e., p∗k = (p∗k,1, p∗k,2, ..., p∗k,J), satifies:
(1) For j1, if there exists another jammer j2, such that ηk,j1 ≤
ηj2 and uj1 ≤ uk,j2 , then p∗k,j1 = 0;(2) For k1, if there exists two jammers j2 and j3, such that
ηk,j2 ≤ ηk,j1 ≤ ηk,j3 , uk,j2 ≤ uk,j1 ≤ uk,j3 , and
uk,j1−uk,j3
ck,j1−ck,j3
≤ uk,j2−uk,j3ck,j2−ck,j3 , then p
∗
k,j1
= 0.
Intuitively, the first part of Lemma 1 shows that if a jammer
has small normalized and original expected HE, then it can
be removed. The second part of Lemma 1 shows that if
a jammer has small normalized expected HE and medium
original expected HE, but the increasing rate is smaller than
another jammer with larger expected HE, then it can also be
removed.
Proof: The key idea of this proof is that, if the con-
ditions is satisfied, and there is a feasible solution pk =
(pk,1, pk,2, ..., pk,J) such that pk,j1 > 0, then we can construct
another feasible solution p′k such that p′k,j1 = 0, without
reducing the objective value vk(ρk).
We first prove part (1). Under the conditions of part (1), if
pk is a feasible solution of SPk with pk,j1 > 0, then consider
another solution p′k, where p′k,j = pk,j for j /∈ {j1, j2},
p′k,j = 0, and p′k,j2 = pk,j2 + pk,j1min{
ck,j1
ck,j2
, 1}. Then, we
can verify that p′k is a feasible solution of (SPk), and the
objective value under p′k is no less than that under pk.
For the second part, if the conditions are satisfied and
pk,j1 > 0, then we construct a new solution p′k by re-allocating
the energy budget consumed by jammer j1 to jammer j2
and j3, without violating the constraints. Specifically, we set
the probability the same as the original solution for other
jammers, i.e., p′k,j = pk,j for j /∈ {j1, j2, j3}, and set
p′k,j1 = 0 for jammer j1. For j2 and j3, to maximize
the objective function, we would like to allocate as much
energy budget as possible to j3 unless there is remaining
energy budget. Therefore, we set p′k,j2 = pk,j2 and p
′
k,j3
=
pk,j3 +
pk,j1ck,j1
ck,j3
, if
∑
j 6=j1 pk,j +
pk,j1 ck,j1
ck,j3
≤ 1; or, p′k,j2 =
pk,j2 +
pk,j1 ck,j1−(1−
∑
j 6=j1
pk,j)ck,j3
ck,j2−ck,j3
and p′k,j3 = pk,j3 +
(1−∑j 6=j1 pk,j)ck,j2−pk,j1 ck,j1
ck,j2−ck,j3
, if
∑
j 6=j1 pk,j +
pk,j1ck,j1
ck,j3
> 1.
We can verify that pk satisfies the constraints of (SPk) but
the objective value is no less than that under pk
With Lemma 1, the scheduler can ignore some jammers
that will obviously be allocated with zero probability under a
given context k. We call the set of the remaining jammers as
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candidate set for context k, denoted as Ak. We propose an
algorithm to construct the candidate jammer set for context k,
as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Find Candidate Jammer Set for ES k
Input: ck,j’s, uk,j’s, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ J ;
Output: Ak;
1: Calculate normalized HE as rewards: ηk,j = uk,j/ck,j;
2: Sort jammers in descending order of their normalized
rewards of HEs:
ηk,j1 ≥ ηk,j2 ≥ ... ≥ ηk,jJ .
3: for a = 2 to J do
4: if ∃a′ < a such that uk,ja ≤ uk,ja′ then
5: Ak = Ak/{ja};
6: end if
7: end for
8: a = 1;
9: while a ≤ J − 1 do
10: Find the jammer with highest increasing rate:
a∗ = argmaxa′:a′>a,ja′∈Ak
uk,ja′ − uk,ja
ck,ja′ − ck,ja
.
11: Remove the jammers in between:
Ak = Ak/{ja′ : a < a′ < a∗}.
12: Move to the next candidate jammer: a = a∗;
13: end while
For ES k, assume that the candidate jammer set Ak =
{jk,1, jk,2, ..., jk,Jk} has been sorted in descending order of
their normalized energy rewards, i.e., ηk,jk,1 ≤ ηk,jk,2 ≤ ... ≤
ηk,jk,Jk . From Algorithm 1, we know that uk,jk,1 < uk,jk,2 <
... < uk,jk,Jk , and ck,jk,1 < ck,jk,2 < ... < ck,jk,Jk .
The scheduler now only needs to consider the jammers in
the candidate set Ak. To decouple the “intra-ES” constraint
(7b), we introduce the following transformation:
pk,jk,a =
{
p˜k,jk,a − p˜k,jk,a+1 , if 1 ≤ a ≤ Jk − 1,
p˜k,jk,Jk , if a = Jk,
(9)
where p˜k,jk,a ∈ [0, 1], and p˜k,jk,a ≤ p˜k,jk,a+1 for 1 ≤
a ≤ Jk − 1. Substituting the transformations into (SPk) and
reformulate it as
(S˜Pk) maximize
Jk∑
a=1
p˜k,jk,a u˜k,jk,a ,
subject to: 
Jk∑
a=1
p˜k,jk,a c˜k,jk,a ≤ ρk, (10a)
p˜k,jk,a ≤ p˜k,jk,a+1 , 1 ≤ a ≤ Jk − 1, (10b)
p˜k,jk,a ∈ [0, 1], ∀a, (10c)
where
u˜k,jk,a =
{
uk,jk,1 , if a = 1,
uk,jk,a − uk,jk,a−1 , if 2 ≤ a ≤ Jk, (11)
c˜k,jk,a =
{
ck,jk,1 , if a = 1,
ck,jk,a − ck,jk,a−1 , if 2 ≤ a ≤ Jk, (12)
Next, we show that the constraint(10) can indeed be re-
moved. For each jk,a, we can view c˜k,jk,a and u˜k,jk,a as
the energy demand and expected HE of a virtual jammer.
Let η˜k,jk,a = u˜k,jk,a/c˜k,jk,a be the normalized expected HE
of virtual jammer jk,a. For a = 1, using uk,jk,1ck,jk,1 ≥
uk,jk,2
ck,jk,2
,
we can show that η˜k,jk,1 ≥ η˜k,jk,2 . For 2 ≤ a ≤ Jk − 1
using
uk,jk,a−uk,jk,a−1
ck,jk,a−ck,jk,a−1
≥ uk,jk,a+1−uk,jk,a−1ck,jk,a+1−ck,jk,a−1 , we can show
that η˜k,jk,a ≥ η˜k,jk,a+1 . In other words, we can verify that
η˜k,jk,1 ≥ η˜k,jk,2 ≥ ... ≥ η˜k,jk,Jk . Thus, without constraint(10), the optimal solution p˜k = [p˜∗k,j1 , p˜∗k,j2 , ..., p˜∗k,jJk ] auto-
matically satisfied p˜∗k,j1 ≥ p˜∗k,j2 ≥ p˜∗k,jJk . Hence, we can
remove the constraint (10), and thus decouple the probability
constraint under a ES.
We can thus rewrite the global ILP problem using the above
transformations
(L˜P ′T,E¯) maximize
K∑
k=1
Jk∑
a=1
πkp˜k,jk,a u˜k,jk,a ,
subject to ∑Kk=1∑Jka=1 πkp˜k,jk,a c˜k,jk,a ≤ E¯T ,
p˜k,jk,a ∈ [0, 1], ∀k, 1 ≤ a ≤ Jk.
The solution of L˜P ′T,E¯ follows a threshold structure. We
sort all ES-(virtual-)jammer pairs (k, ja) in descending order
of their normalized expected HEs. Let k(i), j(i) be the con-
text index and jammer index of the i-th pair, respectively.
Namely, η˜k(1),j(1) ≥ η˜k(2) ,j(2) ≥ ... ≥ η˜k(M),j(M) , where
M =
∑K
k=1 Jk is the total number of candidate jammers for
all ESs. Define a threshold corresponding to ρ = E¯/T ,
i˜(ρ) = max{i :
i∑
i′=1
πk(i′)c˜k(i′),j(i′) ≤ ρ}, (13)
where ρ = E¯/T is the average energy budget. We can verify
that the following solution is optimal for L˜P ′T,E¯ :
p˜k(i),j(i) =

1, if 1 ≤ i ≤ i˜(ρ),
ρ−∑i˜(ρ)
i′=1
π
k(i′)
c˜
k(i′),j(i′)
π
k(i˜(ρ))
c˜
k(i˜(ρ)+1),j(i˜(ρ)+1)
, if i = i˜(ρ) + 1,
0, if i > i˜(ρ) + 1.
(14)
Then, the optimal solution of L˜P ′T,E¯ can be calculated using
the reverse transformation from p˜k,j(ρ)’s to pk,j(ρ)’s.
1) ALP Algorithm: Obviously, the ALP algorithm re-
places the average constraint E¯/T in L˜P ′T,E¯ with the av-
erage remaining energy budget bτ/τ , and obtains probability
pk,j(bτ/τ)). Under context k, the ALP algorithm take jam-
mer j with probability pk,j(bτ/τ). Note that the remaining
energy budget bτ does not follow any classic distribution in
heterogeneous-energy-demand systems. However, by using the
method of averaged bounded differerces [37], we show that
there has the concentration property holds.
Lemma 2. For 0 < δ < 1, there exists a positive number
K, such that under the ALP algorithm, the remaining energy
budget bτ satisfies
P{bτ > (ρ+ δ)τ} ≤ e−Kδ
2τ ,
P{bτ < (ρ− δ)τ} ≤ e−Kδ
2τ .
Proof: We prove the lemma using the method of averaged
bounded differences [37]. The process is similar to Section 7.1
in [37], except that we consider the remaining energy budget
and the successive differences of the remaining energy budget
are bounded by cmax.
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Specifically, let c˜t′ , 1 ≤ t′ ≤ T be the energy budget
consumed under ALP , and let c˜t′ = (c˜1, c˜2, ..., c˜t′). Then
the remaining energy budget at slot t (the remaining time
τ = T − t+ 1), i.e., bT−t+1 is a function of c˜t. We note that
under ALP, the expectation of the ratio between the remain
energy budget and the remaining time does not change, i.e.,
for any b ≤∑j=1 πkc∗j (here c∗j = maxkck,j ), if bτ = b, then
E[bτ−1/(τ − 1)] = b/τ . Thus, we can verify that for any
1 ≤ t′ ≤ t, we have
E[bT−t+1 |˜ct′ ] = bT−t′+1 − bT−t
′+1
T − t′ + 1(t− t
′).
Note that ∆b = bT−t′+2 − bT−t′+1 ≤ cmax and bT−t′+2 ≥
−cmax, we have
|E[bT−t+1 |˜ct′ ]− E[bT−t+1 |˜ct′−1]|
≤ max0≤∆b≤cmax{|∆b−
bT−t′+2
T − t′ + 2 |}
T − t+ 1
T − t′ + 1
≤ 2cmax(T − t+ 1)
T − t′ + 1 .
Moreover,
t∑
t′=1
[
2cmax(T−t+1)
T − t′ + 1 ]
2 = 4c2max(T − t+ 1)2
t∑
t′=1
1
(T − t′ + 1)2
= 4c2max(T − t+ 1)2
T∑
τ ′=T−t+1
1
(τ ′)2
≈ 4c2max(T − t+ 1)2
∫ T
T−t+1
1
(τ ′)2
dτ ′
= 4c2max(T − t+ 1)
t− 1
T
According to Theorem 5.3 in [37], and noting τ = T − t+1,
E[bτ ] = ρτ , we have
P{bτ > E[bτ ]+δτ} ≤ e−
2T (δρτ)2
4c2max(T−t+1)(t−1) ≤ e−
Tδ2E¯2τ
2c2maxT
2(t−1) ≤ e−
δ2ρ2τ
2c2max ,
and similarly,
P{bτ < E[bτ ]− δτ} ≤ e−
δ2ρ2τ
2c2max ,
Choosing K = ρ22c2max concludes the proof.
Then, using similar methods in Section 3, we can
show that the generalized ALP algorithm achieves O(1)
regret in non-boundary cases, and O(
√
T ) regret in
boundary cases, where the boundaries are now defined as
Qi =
∑i
i′=1 πk(i′) c˜k(i′),j(i′) .
Next, we show that the ǫ-First policy with CLT will achieve
O(logT ) regret except for the boundary cases, where it
achieves O(
√
T ) regret. On one hand, according to Hoeffding-
Chernoff bound, if all comparisons pass the confidence level
test, then with probability at least 1−KJ2T−2, the algorithm
obtains the correct rank and provide a right solution for
the problem (LP ′τ,b). On the other hand, because ∆∗ > 0,
from the analysis in the previous section, we know that the
exploration stage will end within O(logT ) rounds with high
probability. Therefore, the expected regret is the same as that
in the case with known ∆(ǫ)min.
Lemma 2 also states that the average remaining budget δ,
τ stays in a neighborhood of the initial average budget ρ with
high probability. Hence, if the initial average budget ρ is not on
boundaries, i.e., the critical values under which the threshold
j˜(ρ) changes, then the probability of threshold changing is
bounded. Therefore, we can show that the ALP algorithm
achieves a very good performance within a constant distance
from the optimum, except for certain boundary cases. Specif-
ically, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K , let qk be the cumulative distribution
function, i.e., qk =
∑k
k′=1 πk′ , and w.l.o.g., let q0 = 0. The
following theorem states the approximate optimality of ALP
for the cases where ρ 6= qk(k = 1, 2, ...,K − 1). We note that
k = 0 and k = K are trivial cases where ALP is optimal.
Theorem 3. Given any fixed ρ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying ρ 6= qk,
k = 1, 2, ...,K−1, the ALP algorithm achieves an O(1) regret.
Specifically,
U∗(T, E¯)− UALP (T, E¯) ≤ u
∗
1 − uK
1− e−2δ2 ,
where δ −min{ρ− qk˜, qk˜+1 − ρ}.
Proof: The proof of this theorem uses the following
two facts derived from lemma 2: E[v(bτ/τ)] = v(p) if
the threshold j˜(bτ/τ) = j˜(ρ) for all possibel bτ ’s, and the
probability that j˜(bτ/τ) 6= j˜(ρ) decays exponentially. Please
referred to Appendix B.1 of the supplementary material for
details.
When considering the boundary eases, we can show simi-
larly that the ALP achieves O(
√
T ) regret.
Theorem 4. Given any fixed ρ = qj , k = 1, 2, ...,K − 1, the
ALP algorithm achieves O(
√
T ) regret. Specifically,
U∗(T, E¯)− UALP (T, E¯) ≤ Θ(o)
√
T +
u∗1 − uK
1− e−2δ′2 ,
where Θ(o) = 2(u∗1 − U∗K)
√
ρ(1 − ρ) and δ′ = min{ρ −
qj˜(ρ)−1, qj˜(ρ)+1 − ρ}.
B. ǫ-ESs-JamNet-UCB-AILP Algorithm: Unknown CSI at ESs
Due to the online placement of passive jammers, the channel
gain htk,j(v) is usually unknown and so that the rewards
of HEs from ESs to the jammer. Now, we consider the
practical case that the expected energy rewards are unknown,
and online learning algorithms are called for, e.g. UCB [38].
As noticed, it is difficult to combine UCB method directly
with the proposed ALP for the general heterogeneous-energy-
demand systems. However, we can narrow down to a special
and very reasonable case, when all jammers have the same
energy demand under a given ES, i.e., ck,j = ck for all j
and k, the normalized expected HE ηk,j represents the quality
of jammer j under ES k. In this case, the candidate jammer
set for each ES only contains one jammer to be scheduled,
which is the jammer with the highest expected HE. Thus,
the previous ALP algorithm for the known statistics case is
simple. When the expected energy rewards are unknown, we
can extend the UCB-AILP algorithm by managing the UCB
for the normalized expected energy rewards.
When the energy demands for different jammers under
the same ES are heterogeneous, it is difficult to combine
AILP with the UCB method since the ALP algorithm in this
case not only requires the ordering of ηk,j ’s, but also the
ordering of uk,j’s and the ratios
uk,j1−uk,j2
ck,j1−ck,j2
. We propose an ǫ-
ESs-JamNet-UCB-AILP Algorithm that explores and exploits
separately: the scheduler takes jammers under all ESs in the
first ǫ(T ) rounds to estimate the expected energy rewards, and
runs ALP based on the estimates in the remaining T − ǫ(T )
rounds.
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Algorithm 2 ǫ-ESs-JamNet-UCB-AILP
Input: Time horizon T , energy budget E¯, exploration stage
length ǫ(T ), and ck,j’s, for all k and j;
1: for t = 1 to ǫ(T ) do
2: if b > 0 then
3: Take jammer At = argmink∈ACXt,j (with random
tie-breaking);
4: Observe the HE YAt,t;
5: Update counter CXt,At = CXt,At+1; update remain-
ing energy budget b = b− cXt,At ;
6: Update the HE estimate:
u¯Xt,At =
(CXt,At − 1)u¯Xt,At + YAt,t
CXt,At
.
7: end if
8: end for
9: for t = ǫ(T ) + 1 to T do
10: Remaining time τ = T − t+ 1;
11: if b > 0 then
12: Obtain the probabilities pk,j(b/τ)’s by solving the
problem (LP ′τ,b) with uk,j replaced by u¯k,j ;
13: Take jammer j with probability pXt,j(b/τ);
14: Remaining energy budget b = b− cXt,At :
15: end if
16: end for
For the case of exposition, we assume ck,j1 6= ck,j2 for any
k and j1 6= j21, and let ∆(c)min = min
k ∈ X
j1, j2 ∈ {0} ∪ A
{|ck,j1−ck,j2 |}.
Let εk,j1,j2 =
uk,j1−uk,j2
ck,j1−ck,j2
for k ∈ X , j1, j2 ∈ {0} ∪ A, and
j1 6= j2 (recall that uk,0 = 0 and ck,0 = 0 for the “dummy
jammer”), ε¯k,j1,j2 be its estimate at the end of the exploration
stage, i.e., ε¯k,j1,j2 =
u¯k,j1−u¯k,j2
ck,j1−ck,j2 . Let ∆
(ε)
min be the minimal
difference between any εk1,j11,j12 and εk2,j21,j22 , i.e.,
∆
(ε)
min = min
k1, k2 ∈ X
j11, j12, j21, j22 ∈ {0} ∪ A
{|εk1,j11,j12 − εk2,j21,j22 |}.
Moreover, let πmin = mink∈X πk and let ∆∗ = ∆(c)min∆
(ε)
min.
Then, the following lemma states that under ǫ-ESs-JamNet-
UCB-AILP with a sufficiently large ǫ(T ), the scheduler will
obtain a correct ordering of εk,j1,j2 ’s with high probability at
the end of the exploration stage.
Lemma 5. Let 0 < δ < 1. Under ǫ-ESs-JamNet-UCB-AILP,
if
ǫ(T ) = ⌈ K
(1− δ)πmin + logTmax{
1
δ2
,
16K
(1− δ)πmin(∆∗)2 }⌉,
then for any contexts k1, k2 ∈ X , and jammers
j11, j12, j21, j22 ∈ {0} ∪ A, if εk1,j11,j12 < εk2,j21,j22 , then
at the end of the ǫ(T )-th slot, we have
P{ε¯k1,j11,j12 < ε¯k2,j21,j22} ≤ (K + 4)T−2.
Moreover, the scheduler ranks all the εk,j1,j2 ’s correctly
with probability no less than 1− (4J + 1)KT−2.
Proof: We first analyze the number of executions for
each ES-jammer pair (k, j) in the exploration stage. Let
1For the case with ck,j1 = ck,j2 for some k and j1 6= j2 (and uk,j1 6=
uk,j2 ), we can correctly remove the suboptimal jammer with high probability
by comparing their empirical energy rewards u¯k,j1 = u¯k,j2
Nk =
∑ǫ(T )
t=1 1(Xt = k) be the number of occurrences of
ES k up to slot ǫ(T ). Recall that the ESs Xt is activated
i.i.d. in each slot by the time-division protocol. Thus, using
Hoeffding-Chernoff Bound for each ES k, we have
P{∀k ∈ X , Nk ≥ (1− δ)πkǫ(T )}
≥ 1−
K∑
k=1
P{Nk < (1 − δ)πkǫ(T )}
≥ 1−Ke−2δ2ǫ(T ) ≥ 1−Ke−2logT = 1−KT−2.
On the other hand, the lower bound (1 − δ)πkǫ(T ) ≥ J +
16JlogT
(∆∗)2 , then
Ck,j ≥ ⌊1 + 16logT
(∆∗)2
⌋ ≥ 16logT
(∆∗)2
, ∀j ∈ A. (20)
Therefore,
P{∀k ∈ X , ∀j ∈ A, Ck,j ≥ 16logT
(∆∗)2
} ≥ 1− JT−2 (21)
Next, we study the relationship between the estimates
ε¯k1,j11,j12 and ε¯k2,j21,j22 at the end of the exploration stage.
We note that
ε¯k1,j11,j12 ≥ ε¯k2,j21,j22
⇔ (ε¯k1,j11,j12 − εk1,j11,j12 − εk2,j21,j22−εk1,j11,j122 )
−(ε¯k2,j21,j22 − εk2,j21,j22 − εk2,j21,j22−εk1,j11,j122 ) ≥ 0
⇔ ( u¯k1,j11−uk1,j11ck1,j11−ck1,j12 −
εk2,j21,j22−εk1,j11,j12
4 )
−( u¯k1,j12−uk1,j12ck1,j11−ck1,j12 +
εk2,j21,j22−εk1,j11,j12
4 )
−( u¯k2,j21−uk2,j21ck2,j21−ck2,j22 +
εk2,j21,j22−εk1,j11,j12
4 )
+(
u¯k2,j22−uk2,j22
ck2,j21−ck1,j22
− εk2,j21,j22−εk1,j11,j124 ) ≥ 0.
Thus, for the event ε¯k1,j11,j12 ≥ ε¯k2,j21,j22 to be true, we re-
quire that at least one term (with the sign) in the last inequality
above is no less than zero. Conditioned on Ck,j ≥ 16logT(∆∗)2 ,
we can bound the probability of each term according to the
Hoeffding-Chefnoff bound, e.g., for the first term, we have
P{ u¯k1,j11−uk1,j11ck1,j11−ck1,j12 −
εk2,j21,j22−εk1,j11,j12
4 ≥ 0|Ck1,j11≥ 16logT
(∆∗)2
}
≤ P{u¯k1,j11≥uk1,j11+∆∗4 |Ck1,j11 ≥
16logT
(∆∗)2 }
≤ e−2logT = T 2.
The conclusion then follows by considering the event {Ck,j ≥
16logT
(∆∗)2 , ∀k ∈ X , ∀j ∈ X} and its negation.
Theorem 6. Let 0 < δ < 1. Under ǫ-ESs-JamNet-UCB-AILP,
if
ǫ(T ) ≥ J
(1 − δ)πmin + logTmax{
1
δ2
,
16J
(1− δ)πmin(∆∗)2 },
then the regret of ǫ-ESs-JamNet-UCB-AILP satisfies:
• if ρ = E¯/T 6= Qi, then Rǫ−FirstALP (T, E¯) = O(logT );
• if ρ = E¯/T = Qi,then Rǫ−FirstALP (T, E¯) = O(
√
T ).
Proof: (Sketch) The key idea of proving this theorem is
considering the event where the εk,j1,j2’s are ranked correctly
and its negation. When the εk,j1,j2 ’s are ranked correctly, we
can use the properties of the ALP algorithm with modification
on the time horizon and energy budget (subtracting the time
and energy budget in the exploration stage, which is O(logT ));
otherwise, if the scheduler obtains a wrong ranking results, the
regret is bounded as O(1) because the probability is O(T−2)
and the HE in each slot is bounded.
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C. A Practical Implementation: Determine ǫ(T ) without Prior
Information
In Theorem 6, the scheduler requires the value of ∆∗ (in fact
∆
(ε)
min because ∆
(c)
min is known) to calculate ǫ(T ). This is usually
impractical since the expected energy rewards are unknown
a priori. Thus, without the knowledge of ∆(ε)min, we propose
a Confidence Level Estimation (CLE) algorithm for deciding
when to end the exploration stage.
Specifically, assume ∆(ε)min > 0 and is unknown by the
scheduler . In each slot of the exploration stage, the scheduler
tries to solve the problem (LP ′τ,b) with uk,j replaced by u¯k,j
using comparison, i.e., using Algorithm 1 and sorting the
virtual jammers. For each comparison, the scheduler tests the
confidence level according th Algorithm 3. If all comparisons
pass the test, i.e., flagSucc = true for all comparisons,
then the scheduler ends the exploration stage and starts the
exploitation stage.
Algorithm 3 Confidence Level Estimation (CLE)
Input: Time horizon T , estimate ε¯k1,j11,j12 , ε¯k2,j21,j22 , num-
ber of executions Ck1,j11 , Ck1,j12 , Ck2,j21 , and Ck2,j22 ;
Output: flagSucc; ∆′ = ∆min(c) (ε¯k1 ,j11,j12−ε¯k2,j21,j22 )2 ;
1: if e−2(∆′)2min{Ck1,j11 ,Ck1.j12} ≤
T−2&e−2(∆
′)2min{Ck2,j21 ,Ck2.j22} ≤ T−2 then
2: flagSucc=true;
3: end if
4: return flagSucc;
By similar arguments as in Theorem 4, we can show that
the ǫ-First policy with CLE will achieve O(logT ) regret
except for the boundary cases, where it achieves O(
√
T )
regret. On one hand, according to Hoeffding-Chernoff bound,
if all comparisons pass the confidence level test, then with
probability at least 1 − KJ2T−2, the algorithm obtains the
correct rank and provide a right solution for the problem
(LP ′τ,b). On the other hand, because ∆∗ > 0, from the
analysis in the previous section, we know that the exploration
stage will end within O(logT ) rounds with high probability.
Therefore, the expected regret is the same as that in the case
with known ∆(ǫ)min.
IV. ONLINE JAMMER PLACEMENT AND POWER
ALLOCATION: A SIMPLE ALGORITHM AND A UPPER
BOUND
In our online jammer placement model, we receive an
unknown number of J friendly jammer placement requests
sequentially over time. Each jammer 1 ≤ j ≤ J targets
at an eavesdropping location pe at F. Let the short nota-
tion djpe(j) denote the distance between the jammer j and
its jammed eavesdropping location pe(j). We denote ∆ =
(maxj djpe(j))/(minj djpe(j)) as the distance ratio. Further,
if jammers are informed with a parameter tj , which denotes
the eavesdropping duration within the jamming scope. We
Γ = (maxi ti)/(mini ti) as the duration ratio. W.l.o.g., we
let mini ti = 1 and maxi ti = Γ. Jammers arrive sequentially
over time and the goal is to accept the minimal number of
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Fig. 3: Guarded safe distance σ for online jammer placement.
requests to interfering all potential eavesdropper while making
minimal noises to legitimate communications.
For each jammer placement request, an online algorithm
must decide whether to accept the request or deny it, and the
decision can not be revoked. For an accepted jammer j it needs
to set a power level Pj and a channel fj ∈ {1, ..., F} to it to
emit the interfering power. In the following we first analyze the
spatial aspect of the problem and assume that eavesdropping
behavior last forever, i.e., tj = ∞. We begin by analyzing a
simple online algorithm for the case of a single channel and
any polynomial power assignment. Our analysis of the online
algorithm introduces a number of critical observations that are
used in later subsections.
The main idea of the algorithm is to accept a new jammer
only if it keeps a safe distance σ from every other previously
accepted jammers to meet two goals: 1) the sum of cumulated
interfering power of all jammers to any legitimate communica-
tions are small enough; 2) the maximized safe distance σ make
the number of jammers placed to be minimized. In particular,
we accept incoming jammer i only if min{dj,ps , ∀ps ∈
∂S, ∀j ∈ J} ≥ σ and max{di,pe(j), dj,pe(i)} ≥ σ for
every other previously accepted jammer j ∈ J . We call this
algorithm JAM-SAFE-DISTANCE. There is a important tradeoff
for the choice of σ among EE of interfering power, validity
and competitive ratio. A larger σ means safeguarding a large
scope of eavesdropping locations with high interfering power
and have resulted in minimized number of jammers to place,
but the SIR constraints of legitimate communications might
become violated. If σ is too small, then more jammers are
required to be placed and at some point the accumulated
interference at an accepted jammer placement request can get
too large and the SIR constraint of legitimate communications
becomes violated.
We strive to devise the JAM-SAFE-DISTANCE to make σ as
large as possible to ensure optimal competitive ratio as well
as not to violate SIR constraints. On the one hand, we need to
bound the interference on the edge of the fence S at accepted
jammer placement requests to construct a worst-case legitimate
communication scenario. On the other hand, we consider an
accepted jammer j block an eavesdropper pe(j) with certain
distance rj . In the following we show that for r ∈ [0, 1] the
choice of
σ=min
2∆,max
4∆r γ
√
72δs
P¯ (γ − 2) ,∆
(1−r) γ
√
P˜
δe

 (22)
is sufficient to yield the Theorem 5 in the following. Denote
the L = min ||S− F|| as the minimal distance among S and
F. If the eavesdropping locations on the F are unavailable, we
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Fig. 4: Interference contributed from each segmented Sectors.
need the additional condition that
L ≥ (
√
2 + 2)σ (23)
to block all eavesdropping points on F.
Theorem 7. In a single channel scenario, JAM-SAFE-DISTANCE
is Ω(∆)-competitive for any polynomial interfering power
assignment with r ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: We first show that JAM-SAFE-DISTANCE is valid,
i.e., for an accepted jammer j the SIR constraint of any loca-
tions at the edge of S never becomes violated. In particular, we
will underestimate the distances of already accepted jammers
to overestimate the interference at any position ps, ∀ps ∈ ∂S.
As such, even under the wrest conditions the SIR constraint
at any potential legitimate receiver, i.e., ps, will remain valid.
To estimate the interference at ps, we have to calculate how
many jammers may be placed at which distance. Using the fact
L ≥ 2∆ ≥ σ as shown in Fig. 3. Then, it is straightforward
to devise the rule of the algorithm such that any two different
accepted jammers are at least a distance of σ−∆ ≤ σ/2 apart
to block eavesdroppers on the F. We segment all of R2 into
2-dimensional squares with length σ/4 and we call it sectors.
The greatest distance within a sector is σ
√
2/4 = σ/2
√
2 ≤
σ/2. Each sector can contain jammer from at most one request,
so there are at most two jammers in every sector.
W.l.o.g., we assume that sectors are created such that the
jammer j lies in a corner point of 22 sectors. We divide the set
of sectors into layers. The first layer consists of the 22 sectors
incident to j. The second layer are all sectors not within the
first layer but share at least a point with sector from the first
layer, and so on. Hence, there are (2l)2 sectors from layers
1 through l, and their union is a large square of side length
2lσ/4 with j in the center. Therefore, there are exactly 22(l2−
(l− 1)2) sectors in layer l. Due to the algorithm there can be
no sender at a distance smaller than σ from j. The sector of
smallest layer that is at a distance at least σ from j can be
reached along the diagonal of the squares of that layer. There
can be no jammer in all sectors from layers 1 through l′,
where l′ is bounded by σ ≤ l′(σ/2√2), which yields l′ ≥ 3.
For bounding the interference assume that in all sectors of
layer l ≥ 3 there are two jammers. Note that all jammer in
sectors from a layer l have a distance at least (l − 1)σ/4 to
j. To bound the interference that is created at j, we use the
following technical lemma from [36] under R2.
Lemma 8. For γ > 2 ≥ 1 the following holds:
22 ·
∞∑
l=3
l2 − (l − 1)2
(l − 1)γ <
36
γ − 2 .
With Lemma 6 and set Pj = drγjpe(j), we bound the
interference for legitimate communication
I=
∑
j∈J
drγjpe(j)
dγjps
<2∆rγ
∞∑
l=3
22(l2−(l− 1)2)
((l − 1)σ/4)σ <2∆
rγ(
4
σ
)γ · 36
γ − 2 .
To satisfy the SIR constraint at ps, we let P¯ ≥ δsI , i.e.,
2δs∆
rγ · ( 4
σ
)γ · 36
γ − 2 ≤ P¯ .
This yields a lower bound for the distance σ,
σ ≥ 4 ·∆r · γ
√
72δs
P¯ (γ − 2) , (24)
which can be verified to hold for our choice of σ.
Then, to bound the SIR constraint at pe, we use the fact
that in the worst condition if there is no other jammer, a
single jammer j is enough to thwart the eavesdropper, i.e.,
drγjpe(j)/d
γ
jpe(j)
δe ≥ P˜ /dγs(pe)pe . Note that d
rγ
jpe(j)
/dγjpe(j) =
d
(r−1)γ
jpe(j)
≥ ∆(r−1)γ and ds(pe)pe ≥ L ≥ σ, we have
∆(r−1)γδe ≥ P˜
σγ
. (25)
This yields another lower bound for σ
σ ≥ ∆(1−r) γ
√
P˜
δe
. (26)
Combine results (24) and (27) yields (22).
Moreover, when the locations of eavesdroppers are unavail-
able, every placed jammer is necessary to block all eavesdrop-
ping position on the intersections of its sector and the fence S.
Denote the furthest eavesdropping position within the sector as
p′e. Then we have d
rγ
jpe(j)
/dγjp′eδe ≥ d
rγ
jpe(j)
/(djpe +dp′epe)
γδe.
Due to the size of the sector we have that dp′epe ≤
√
2. Also
djpe ≥ 1, which implies
drγjpe(j)δe
(djpe + dp′epe)
γ
≥ 1
(
√
2 + 1)γ
drγjpe(j)
dγjpe
δe ≥ ∆
(r−1)γδe
(
√
2 + 1)γ
. (27)
On the other hand, use the condition (23) that we upper bound
P˜ /dγs(p′e)p′e
≤ P˜ /(L− σ)γ ≤ P˜
(
√
2+1)γσγ
. Use the fact that
(25), we have
∆(r−1)γδe
(
√
2 + 1)γ
≥ P˜
(
√
2 + 1)γσγ
. (28)
To bound the competitive ratio we need the following
Density Lemma, which is motivated by Lemma 3 in Andrews
and Dinitz [35] to restrict interference both from senders and
at receivers for any legitimate communication links. However,
the placement of friendly jammer is interesting to be found
as a different problem. In this case, we need to estimate
the interference caused at the legitimate communication of a
placed jammer by mapping its transmission power calculated
from the SIR constraint at the eavesdropper.
Lemma 9. (Density Lemma) Assume a sector A with side-
length x ≥ 1 and any feasible jammer placement solution with
arbitrary power assignment. There can be only δe3
γ L¯λ
δs
P¯
P˜
(x+
1)2 jammer placement requests in A.
Proof: We first assume x = 1 and consider the number of
jammers in section A. At first, the interfering power receiving
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by from a jammer j to its targeted eavesdropper pe(j) is
a constant p¯ = Pj/d
γ
jpe(j)
such that p¯δe ≥ P˜ /dγs(pe)pe
for any jammer placement request j within A. Consider the
interfering power contributed to the legitimate communication
by the same jammer j. Due to the fact that max djpepe(j) ≤
2min djs(pe). Also djpe(j) ≥ 1, which implies
Pj
dγ
js(pe)
≥ Pj(
d
jpes(pe)
+d
jpe(j)
)γ ≥ 1(1+2)γ p¯
≥ 1δe3γ P˜dγs(pe)pe(j) ≥
1
δe3γ
P˜
L¯λ
,
(29)
where we have the L¯ = max ||S − F||. Thus, if more
than δe3
γ L¯λ
δs
P¯
P˜
such placement request are present, the SIR
constraint for the legitimate communication is violated. Now
consider the arbitrary power allocation strategy. If we arti-
ficially reduce powers such that all the jamming links to F
experience a minimal signal strength p¯, and then increase
powers to their original value. The increase lowers SIR for the
jammers that continue to have a signal strength of p¯. Hence,
if more than δe3
γ L¯λ
δs
P¯
P˜
jammers are present in A, at least one
SINR constraint is violated.
The density lemma allows a simple way to bound the num-
ber of jammers the optimum solution can accept in the blocked
area. First consider a jammer j of a placement request accepted
by JAM-SAFE-DISTANCE. The jammer blocks a square of radius
σ for eavesdroppers and limit the placement of other requests
to reduce the interference to legitimate communications. We
overestimate its size by a sector of side-length 2σ centered at
j. By the density lemma, the optimum solution can accept at
most δe3
γ L¯λ
δs
P¯
P˜
(2σ + 1)2 jammers, which is Ω(∆) according
to (22) (σ = Ω(∆1/2)) for fixed δs, δe and γ. Finally, note
that σ is chosen to maximize the competitive ratio and does
not optimize its involved constants.
In the next, we use similar arguments to show a result for
any other polynomial power assignment. As safe distance we
pick σ+ = ∆r · σ if r > 1, and σ− = ∆1−r · σ if r < 0.
Corollary 10. JAM-SAFE-DISTANCE is Ω(∆2·max{r,1−r})-
competitive for a polynomial power assignment with r /∈ (0, 1)
and a single channel.
Proof: In the case r > 1 we note for validity of the
algorithm that the interference at an accepted jammer j is
again bounded by
I=
∑
j∈J
drγjpe(j)
dγjps
≤ ∆rγ
∑
j∈J
1
dγjps
<2∆rγ · ( 4
σ+
)γ · 36
(γ − 2) .
The SIR constraint now requires that P¯ ≥ δsI at ps. This
yields a lower bound of
σ+ ≥ 4 ·∆r · γ
√
72δs
P¯ (γ − 2) . (30)
If r < 0, then the interference is maximized with requests
of length 1 in each sector. The interference is thus bounded
by
I=
∑
j∈J
drγjpe(j)
dγjps
≤ ∆rγ
∑
j∈J
1
dγjps
< 2 · ( 4
σ−
)γ · 36
γ − d .
The SIR constraint now requires that P¯ ≥ δsI at ps. This
yields a lower bound
σ− ≥ 4 · γ
√
72δs
P¯ (γ − 2) . (31)
Similarly, we need to bound the SIR constraint at pe, we use
the fact that in the worst condition if there is no other jammer,
a single jammer j is enough to thwart the eavesdropper. In
the case r > 1, note that drγjpe(j)/d
γ
jpe(j)
δe = d
(r−1)γ
jpe(j)
δe ≥
∆(r−1)γδe ≥ δe ≥ P˜ /dγs(pe)pe and ds(pe)pe ≥ L ≥ σ, we
have δe ≥ P˜(σ+)γ . This yields another lower bound for σ+
σ+ ≥ γ
√
P˜
δe
. (32)
If r < 0, we have drγjpe(j)/d
γ
jpe(j)
δe = d
(r−1)γ
jpe(j)
δe ≥
∆(r−1)γδe ≥ P˜ /dγs(pe)pe . This yields another lower bound
for σ−
σ− ≥ ∆(1−r) γ
√
P˜
δe
. (33)
Combine results (30), (31) , (32) and (33), the corollary
follows.
Comparing the results in Theorem 5 and Corollary 8,
it shows that the competitive ratio of JAM-SAFE-DISTANCE
is asymptotically optimal for polynomial power assignments
with r ∈ (0, 1). This includes both the uniform and linear
power assignment. Next, we bound the competitive ratio for
any deterministic online jammer placement algorithm using
polynomial power assignments. This can be generalized to a
lower bound for any distance-based power assignment.
Theorem 11. Every deterministic online jammer placement
algorithm using polynomial power assignments has a compet-
itive ratio (1) O(∆)-competitive using distance-based power
assignments.
Proof: The main ingredient in the proof is that every
deterministic online jammer placement algorithm has to accept
the first jammer that arrives, otherwise it risks having an
unbounded competitive ratio. Note that the jamemrs can be
replaced over time, we can repeat the following instance suf-
ficiently often and keep a sufficiently large distance between
the instances. In this way we can neglect the constant a from
the competitive ratio.
Since all jammer placements are directed (to eavesdroppers)
and use polynomial power assignment. Let the first request
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have length ∆. From the SIR constraints, we bound the
minimum distance every other successful jammer request has
to keep to the fence F. This yields a blocked area in which the
online jammer placement algorithm is not able to accept any
request. We then count the maximum number of requests that
can be placed into this region, where the optimum solution
can accept simultaneously.
To extend the previous arguments to arbitrary distance-based
power assignments, we observe that the previous lower bound
uses only requests of length 1 and ∆. Let φ be the function
of the distance-based power assignment, then φ(∆) is the
power of the first request. The lower bound for this power
assignment behaves exactly as for a polynomial assignment
with r = (logφ(∆))/(αlog∆).
Note that when a power assignment is not distance-based,
it might assign different powers to small requests based on
whether they are near the sender or the receiver of the first
request. This is not helpful since the jammer have a direct
interfering link to the eavesdroppers. In this case, we create
the same instance using only undirected requests. Then we
get a blocked area of at least Ω(∆) for any polynomial power
assignment around both points of the first request. Using the
normalization of powers as before we observe that there is a
blocked area of size Ω(∆) for any small request, no matter
which power we assign to it. This proves the theorem.
V. IMPROVED COMPETITIVE RATIOS AND EE UNDER
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL EXTENSIONS
A. Jammer placement request with duration
In the previous sections we assumed that requests last
forever, analyzing only the spatial aspect of the problem. We
now show how our results extend when each request i has a
duration ti. After time ti an accepted request stops sending
and leaves(thus, no longer causing interference).
We show the modification for the algorithm SAFE-DISTANCE
for r ∈ [0, 1]. We adapt the algorithm in the following way.
It accepts a given request i if and only if the safe distance
σ holds to all previously accepted requests that are active at
some point time in i’s duration.
Our first observation is the following. If we consider a
fixed point in time, an optimal solution OPT can have at most
O(∆d) more requests than our algorithm, as this corresponds
to the spatial problem. Now let i be a request accepted by
SAFE-DISTANCE with smallest duration possible, that is, ti = 1.
Each request contained in an optimal solution that interferes
with i is active at least either when i starts or when it stops
sending. So it is sufficient to count the accepted requests in
OPT at both of these points in time to upper bound the number
of requests blocked by i, which is 2 · O(∆d). Furthermore, a
request i with ti ≤ Γ can be split into at most Γ requests of
duration 1, thus blocking at most (Γ + 1) · O(∆d) requests.
The argumentation is similar for other polynomial power
assignments and results in an additional factor of Γ in all
previously shown bounds.
In the case of multiple channels, for k = k′·k′′, clustering of
requests w.r.t. similar length and duration values can be used to
improver the ratio for our algorithm SAFE-DISTANCE to O(k ·
Γ1/k
′
∆(d/2k
′′)+ǫ). Choosing k = logΓ · log∆, RANDOMSAFE-
DISTANCE becomes O(logΓ · log∆0)-competitive.
B. Multiple Channels
In this section we show how to generalize the algorithms
above to k channels and decrease their competitive ratio. We
propose a k− channeladjustment, in which we separate the
problem by using certain channels only for specific request
lengths. All requests with length in [∆(i−1)/k,∆i/k] are as-
signed to channel i, for i = 1,...,k, where we assign requests of
length ∆i/k arbitrarily to channel i or i+1. For each channel i
we apply an algorithm outlined above, which makes decisions
about acceptance and power of requests assigned to channel i.
Using this separation, we effectively reduce the aspect ratio to
∆1/k on each channel. If the optimum solution has to adhere to
the same length separation on the channels, this would yield a
denominator k in the exponents of ∆ of the competitive ratios.
Obviously, the optimum solution is not tied to our separation,
but the possible improvement due to this degree of freedom
can easily be bounded by a factor k. This yields the following
corollary.
Corollary 12. MULTI-CLASS SAFE-DISTANCE with k-channel
adjustment is O(k∆(d/2k)+ǫ)-competitive using the square-
root power assignment. SAFE-DISTANCE with k-channel adjust-
ment is O(k∆d/k)-competitive for any polynomial assignment
with r ∈ [0, 1], and O(k∆max{r,1−r}·d/k)-competitive for
r /∈ [0, 1].
VI. SIMULATIONS
We conducted preliminary experiments to compare the
different numbers of the eavesdroppers. The setting we have
chosen is the storage/fence shown in Figure 5. The fence is of
dimensions 500×300 units and we placed a grid of 1×1 cells
in the entire region. We simulated both JAM-SAFEDIST-POWER
and JAM-LIFEMAX in this setting. For the power assignment
from JAM-SAFEDIST-POWER, we investigated the difference in
number of jammers. Finally, we observed the variation in total
power assigned with ǫ and δ and the number of jammers palced
with ǫ, δ and Pˆ . We set the round number T is 300. Give the
energy conversion rate α(v) = 0.4 and the average distance
l¯ = 4 as the distance l ∈ [1, 10]. Therefore we can conclude the
energy attenuation factor l¯γ = 16 when the γ = 4. We chosen
the following values: (i)ǫ = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5},(ii)δ =
{0.5, 0.6, ..., 1.0}, (iii)Pˆ = {(1/ǫ), (2/ǫ), ..., (5/ǫ)}. In both
numbers of the eavesdroppers, we removed all grid points
which were in the forbidden region.
For JAM-SAFEDIST-POWER, the decline is more steep than
the JAM-LIFEMAX because of the 300 rounds cause the JAM-
LIFEMAX data is obtained by repeated average. The JAM-
SAFE-DistPower and JAM-LIFE-Max give the same information
about the desired jammers become more and more as the
eavesdroppers goes up. The last two figures about the JAM-
SAFEDIST-MultiChannel talk us the multichannel give the
much less desired jammers but the benefits of multichannel
will reduce as the channel grows in number in two different
ways based on the Ne = 6.
13
(a) Storage/fence with candidate locations (small
dots) and solution of Jamming-LP(Large dots) 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
T
o
ta
l 
P
o
w
e
r 
T
ra
n
s
fe
re
d
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Ne=4
Ne=6
Ne=10
Ne=20
(b) JAM-SAFEDIST-POWER.
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
T
o
ta
l 
E
n
e
rg
y
 T
ra
n
s
fe
re
d
106
0
1
2
3
4
Ne=4
Ne=6
Ne=10
Ne=20
(c) JAM-LIFEMAX.
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(f) JAM-SAFEDIST-MultiChannel.
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Fig. 6: Results of simulations under proposed online algorithms.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose the first the first distributed proto-
col that provides secure communication in any geographically
restricted communication networks using energy-constrained
friendly jammers wirelessly powered by legitimate transmitters
as energy sources. Online learning algorithms are proposed
to maximize the lifetime of jammer and met the goal of EE
with heterogenous energy demands. Our protocol supports
dynamic behaviors, e.g., mobility, eavesdropping (communi-
cating) completion or addition/removal of nodes, as along the
secure communication are restricted to the storage. However,
our proposed protocol is adaptive to the situations such in-
formation is available, e.g., exact positions and frequency of
both legitimate communications and eavesdropping behaviors,
and foreseen further EE improvements and reduced number
of jammers. We provided competitive ratios for approximate
algorithms in several distributed settings, and found the multi-
channel diversity is a good approach to improve the security
of wireless communications.
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